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Abstract 
We analyze the relationship between returns on equity and long-term government bonds in 
the Spanish economy. In particular, we are interested in the stability of the relationship across 
differing market conditions and if long-term bonds deliver diversification benefits during 
periods of equity market turbulence. Employing a Markov-switching vector autoregression 
model with three regimes, we find that Spanish bond returns become more positively 
correlated with domestic equity returns during periods of financial distress. A sectoral 
analysis reveals that two sectors – Financials and Oil & Gas – are responsible for this positive 
comovement with the former being relatively more important. 
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1. Introduction 
 The stock-bond relationship is an important determinant of the portfolio 
choice of investors. Longer-term investors typically hold long positions in both equity 
and long-term government bonds despite stock returns out-performing bonds over the 
long term. Therefore, the main motive for holding bonds appears to be for their 
potential diversification benefits, in order to reduce the risk of an investor’s equity 
position. Brennan and Xia (2000) and Campbell and Viceira (2001, 2002) provide 
empirical evidence in support of this view. When allocating funds between U.S. 
equities and bonds, they find that the demand for long-term bonds increases with both 
the investment horizon and the risk aversion of the investor. 
 The relationship between stock and bond returns has been extensively studied 
for the U.S. In general, the early literature suggests that long-term bonds provide a 
good hedge or act as a ‘safe haven’ for equity investors. For example, Fleming et al. 
(1998) and Scruggs and Glabadanidis (2003) both find that stock market shocks illicit 
little response in measures of bond market risk. More recently, studies such as Baele 
et al. (2010) document substantial time-variation in the co-movements of stocks and 
bonds. One possible explanation is that it is driven by market conditions and a ‘flight-
to-safety’ reaction whereby investors flee equity markets during episodes of market 
turbulence and take refuge in relatively safe assets, such as government bonds. 
Evidence consistent with this is provided by Connolly et al. (2005), Guidolin and 
Timmermann (2006), Anderson et al. (2008), Yang et al. (2009) and Flavin et al. 
(2014) among others, who all report a negative correlation between stock and bond 
returns during periods of high volatility in financial markets. Therefore equity 
investors may be induced to allocate some funds to government bonds to hedge their 
risk. 
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This relationship also seems to hold during periods of market turbulence in 
non-U.S. markets. For example, Baur and Lucey (2009) find negative stock-bond 
correlations for eight developed markets, while Chang and Hsueh (2013) confirm this 
finding for a group of Asia-Pacific countries. However, during the most recent 
financial crisis, a different pattern has begun to emerge for some of the Eurozone 
periphery countries. Acosta-González et al. (2016) have pointed out that, during the 
recent crisis, the correlation between bond returns and stock returns inverted from 
negative to positive in countries like Italy and Spain, so bonds, unlike previous 
studies, do not act as a safe haven for equity investors. Jammazi et al. (2015) also find 
a positive stock-bond link in Spain, Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Belgium since the 
beginning of the European sovereign debt crisis in late 2009. They conclude that this 
may be attributed to investors moving away from stock and government bond markets 
of peripheral countries to invest in economies with more solid fundamentals. 
 We delve deeper into the driving forces behind this change in stock-bond co-
movement and apply a new methodology to a sectoral analysis of Spanish financial 
markets. While we sacrifice some geographical scope, this country-specific analysis 
allows us to drill deeper into the relationship and provide a better understanding of 
stock-bond correlations. Specifically we analyse the relationship for Spain using a 
Markov-switching vector autoregression (MS-VAR) model which allows us to assess 
the time-variation in the conditional correlation across market conditions. 
Furthermore, we generate regime-specific impulse response functions (IRFs) to study 
changes in the dynamics of the relationship across regimes. The analysis is conducted 
for the equity market index and at finer level of disaggregation using ten sectoral 
indices. Our results confirm the aforementioned pattern at the market level as 
domestic long-term bonds and equity are positively correlated during stock market 
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downturns. However, the sectoral analysis reveals that this result is mainly driven by 
the financial sector, with returns on most other sectors displaying negative or zero co-
movement with long-term bonds during bear markets. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the 
econometric methodology and our data. Section 3 presents our empirical results and 
discusses their implications, while section 4 contains our concluding remarks. 
 
2. Econometric Methodology and Data 
2.1 Econometric model: specification and estimation 
We employ a Markov-switching vector autoregression (MS-VAR) model to 
capture the dynamics of the relationship between Spanish equities and long-term 
government bonds. We study the stability of shock transmission across regimes by 
analyzing regime-dependent impulse response functions (IRFs).1 These allow us to 
study both the contemporaneous response of the asset returns to a stock market shock 
and the stability of the dynamics of shocks across regimes. 
 We estimate bivariate MS-VAR models for stock and bond returns. Initially, 
we focus on the market index and then repeat the analysis at the stock market sectoral 
level to provide a finer assessment of the relationship between Spanish equity and 
bond returns. We specify the dependent vector of variables as  
yt ={equity return, bond return}t. 
This ordering of the variables implies that the equity return affects both variables 
contemporaneously but shocks in the bond market only affect the stock market 
variable with a time lag. Given that stock market shocks are usually larger in 
magnitude and more frequent, we prefer to allow them have an immediate influence 
                                                 
1 Ehrmann et al. (2003) show how to generate regime-dependent IRFs in a Markov-switching VAR. 
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on both variables. As a robustness check, we later re-order the variables to check the 
consequences of this restriction. 
 In our models, we allow for up to three distinct regimes, which correspond to a 
bull, normal and bear market conditions. As in Guidolin and Timmermann (2005), we 
find that two regimes are not sufficient to capture the market dynamics and hence opt 
for the higher dimension specification. 
We estimate the following MS-VAR model: 
ݕ௧ ൌ ߣሺݏ௧ሻ ൅ ∑ ߠ௣ሺݏ௧ሻݕ௜,௧ି௣ ൅௣ଵ ߝ௧௦௧  (1) 
ܵ௧ ∈ ሼ1,2,3ሽ 
ߝ௜,௧௦௧~݅. ݅. ݀. ሺ0, ߪ௦ଶሻ 
where yi,t is a 2x1 vector as defined above. The regression constant (λ), the matrix of 
autoregressive coefficients (θ) and the covariance matrix of residuals (σ) are all 
regime-dependent. St.is the unobservable latent variable, which takes a value of unity 
in bull markets (positive returns and low volatility), a value of 2 in ‘normal’ market 
conditions (returns are approximately zero and low asset volatility) and a value of 3 in 
bear markets (negative returns and high-volatility). Given that the regime path is not 
observed, we need to specify its evolution over time. Following the regime-switching 
literature, the regime paths are Markov switching and are endogenously determined. 
The conditional matrix of transition probabilities has the following typical element: 
ijtt pjSiS   ]|[Pr 1 .     (2) 
The model is estimated using a Bayesian Markov-chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) 
approach. We first specify the prior distributions for the parameters. For the variances, 
we employ a Wishart distribution, the VAR coefficeints have a flat prior and we use a 
weak Dirichlet prior for the transitions, with a preference towards remaining in the 
same state. Using Gibbs sampling, we estimate the parameters and regimes in the 
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following sequence; 
Step 1: We draw the sigmas, given the mean coefficients and regimes.  
Step 2: We draw the mean coefficients (λ and θ) given sigmas and regimes. 
Step 3: We draw the regimes, given the sigmas and mean coefficients. 
Step 4: We draw the transition parameters. 
This sequence of steps is repeated 10,000 times after discarding an initial 
‘burn-in’ set of 2000 replications. Once we have obtained our estimated parameters, 
we generate the regime-dependent IRFs and their associated confidence bands. The 
IRFs are the Choleski factors standardized to unit variances. This allows us to 
compare differences in dynamics rather than differences in variances, since what we 
are interested in is the stability of the shock transmission across regimes. 
 
2.2 Data 
 Our data set consists of daily returns on Spanish equities and long-term 
government bonds. We employ Datastream-constructed total return indices for both 
the equity market (TOTMKES) and 10-year government bonds (BMES10Y). Later, 
we disaggregate the equity index into ten sectors. These are based on the FTSE’s 
Industry Classification Benchmark and the sectors are Financials, Oil & Gas, Basic 
Materials, Industrials, Consumer Goods, Consumer Services, Telecoms, Technology, 
Utilities and Healthcare. Our sample covers the period from January 1st, 2004 to 
December 31st, 2015. 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for all return series. Panels A and B refer 
to the market-level and sectoral returns respectively. Panel A reveals that, over the 
sample period, the mean returns on equities and the 10-year bond are roughly the 
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same, while the stock market index displays far greater volatility. In risk-return terms, 
bonds proved a much more attractive investment over the period. Both series are 
positively skewed and exhibit significant levels of kurtosis. 
There are striking differences across the sectoral indices. Technology is the 
only sector to record a negative mean return but returns in the financial, oil & gas 
telecoms and basic materials sectors are all below the overall market average. The 
poor performance of these sectors is further compounded by relatively high levels of 
risk, especially for financial and technology firms. In contrast, firms operating in the 
consumer goods, consumer services, healthcare and utilities sectors all outperform the 
market in terms of returns and have relatively low risk levels. The consumer goods 
sector is clearly the most stable sector in the Spanish equity market.  
All sectoral returns exhibit skewness and strong evidence of kurtosis. With the 
exception of the financial sector, all returns are negatively skewed. The prevalence of 
fat tails suggests that modeling these returns in a Markov-switching framework may 
be a better approach than in a single state setting.  
 
3. Discussion of results 
3.1 Results of the MS-VAR model 
A bivariate MS-VAR model is estimated for each of the Spanish stock market 
indices, with the vector of dependent variables containing the returns of one sectoral 
equity index and the returns to the long-term sovereign bond. The estimation 
procedure is outlined above and, in all applications, we find that a three-regime 
specification is preferable to a more parsimonious representation. We identify the 
regimes from the estimated volatilities and they are consistent with the existence of 
bull, bear and ‘normal’ phases of market dynamics. Bull markets are characterized by 
 7
positive growth and low volatility, bear regimes by negative returns and high 
volatility and ‘normal’2 conditions combine zero returns with an intermediate level of 
volatility. 
Tables 2 and 3 contain regime-specific estimates of expected returns and 
volatilities respectively, for both equities and the 10-year government bond. The 
former shows that the long-term bond generates positive expected returns across all 
three regimes, suggesting that volatility in the financial system is coming mainly from 
the equity markets. Bull markets have positive expected returns for all equity indices; 
‘normal’ markets have approximately zero expected equity returns; while bear 
markets exhibit large negative stock returns. The largest declines are recorded in the 
Oil & Gas, Utilities and Industrial sectors. In general, the magnitude of returns in the 
bear regime is the largest but they are often imprecisely estimated due to increased 
volatility in the system. Focusing on results for the total equity-bond pairing reveals 
some further insights about the bear regime. The expected bond return falls in this 
regime, indicating that both markets were suffering financial distress. Common 
factors such as liquidity shortages are likely to have played a role in both markets. 
The asset volatilities (Table 3) confirm some stylized facts. Stock market 
returns are more volatile than returns in the bond market in all regimes. Furthermore, 
the volatility increases are far more pronounced for equity returns than bond returns as 
we move from bear to normal to bear regimes. The Oil & Gas sector is particularly 
volatile during the bear regime. 
[Insert Figure 1 here] 
Figure 1 presents the smoothed probabilities of the regimes for the market-level 
analysis.3 The graph shows the prevailing financial market conditions over the sample 
                                                 
2 Alternatively, this could be referred to as a ‘stagnation’ regime as the returns are very close to zero 
and never statistically significantly different from zero. 
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period. The initial period is a clear bull market regime, associated with strong stock 
market and economic growth. This is interspersed with some short periods of ‘normal’ 
market conditions before the first transition to a bear regime in late 2008 as the U.S. 
credit crisis transmitted to international markets following the collapse of Lehman 
Brothers.4 ‘Normal’ conditions were re-established before the most prolonged bear 
period in 2011 when Spain looked likely to be drawn into the developing Eurozone 
sovereign debt crisis. Bear regimes tend to be less persistent than other regimes but 
are associated with falling returns and increasing uncertainty. The sample ends in a 
mainly normal regime with some sporadic spurts of growth. 
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
Table 4 contains information of the regime characteristics for all applications. 
In particular, we report ‘Duration’ and ‘Frequency’ statistics for the three regimes. 
‘Duration’ (measured in days) captures the average time for which each state persists, 
while ‘Frequency’ measures the proportion of the time that the system spends in each 
of the regimes. Consistent with Figure 1, we find that bear markets have relatively 
short duration – about 7 days in the case of the market index – and most often account 
for the shortest proportion of time. On average, across sectors, a high-volatility shock 
persists for nearly 10 days but ranges from 4 days in the case of Consumer Goods to 
17 days in the model for Consumer Services. The latter also experiences the most 
protracted bear regime and spends about 41% of the sample period in this tumultuous 
state. At the other extreme, Oil & Gas only spends 9% of the time in the highest-
volatility state and shocks die out after about 5 days. We already noted that this sector 
                                                                                                                                            
3 Similar graphs are available for each application of the model and are available upon request. 
However to conserve space, we do not include the graphs for the sectors. 
4 Aït-Sahalia et al. (2009) attribute (in part) the ‘internationalization’ of the U.S. crisis to liquidity 
shortages following the fall of Lehman Brothers in September 2010. 
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exhibited the highest volatility during the bear regime so these regimes are short, rare 
but intense. 
Given the prolonged period of growth economic growth that preceded the bust, bull 
markets prevail for a great deal of time, especially for the Telecom, Utilities and 
Consumer Goods sectors. Positive shocks are persistent, with a duration of about 19 
and 37 days for the total market and the financial sector, respectively. ‘Normal’ 
regime shocks persist for between 12-19 days across sectors and their frequency 
varies greatly across sectors. 
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
Table 5 presents estimates of the transition probabilities for the total market 
and each sector, with pij representing of moving from regime j to i. All regimes are 
quite persistent, particularly in the case of ‘Bull’ and ‘Normal’ states. For example, in 
the total market-bond application, the probability of remaining in the ‘Bull’ or 
‘Normal’ regime, given that is where you were one period ago, is 0.946 and 0.927 
respectively. ‘Bear’ regimes are slightly less persistent, with a corresponding 
probability of staying in this state of 0.861.  
Continuing to focus on the total market application, we find that having started 
in ‘Bull’ regime, the financial system is more likely to transit to a ‘Normal’ rather 
than a ‘Bear’ regime (i.e. p21 > p31). Leaving a ‘Normal’ regime has roughly equal 
probability of moving to a ‘Bull’ or ‘Bear’ regime, while a movement out of a ‘Bear’ 
regime has a higher probability of being to a ‘Normal’ rather than a ‘Bull’ regime. 
This pattern is replicated for the sectoral analysis of Financials and Oil & Gas. The 
other sectors exhibit larger jumps between regimes with movements between extreme 
regimes relatively more common. For these sectors, movements out of ‘Bull’ and 
‘Bear’ regimes often tend to bypass the ‘Normal’ regime.  
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3.2 Regime-specific correlations. 
We begin the analysis of the Spanish stock-bond relationship by focusing on 
the regime-specific correlations generated by the MS-VAR model. Though not a 
statistical test for stability of relationships, they provide an overview of the 
comovement changes between the three regimes. Table 6 presents the correlations. 
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
A number of interesting features of the relationship emerge from this analysis. Firstly, 
‘Bull’ markets exhibit negative comovement between the two asset classes for all 
equity indices employed. Equity and bond returns tend to move in opposite directions 
during periods of positive stock market news as investors re-balance portfolios in 
favor of the high-yielding asset. Secondly, during ‘Normal’ market conditions, the 
correlations all turn positive, implying that returns to both assets move in the same 
direction in response to shocks during this relatively stagnant period. Thirdly, the sign 
of the correlation is not uniform across stock market sectors during ‘Bear’ regimes. 
As documented in Jammazi et al. (2015) and Acosta-González et al. (2016), returns to 
the total stock index and the long-term bond are positively correlated. As ‘Bear’ 
regimes are characterised by negative shocks, this suggests that Spanish bonds do not 
act as ‘safe-havens’ for investors in the Spanish equity market. However, our sectoral 
analysis reveals some heterogeneity in the comovements, with only Financials and Oil 
& Gas exhibiting this tendency for positive comovement during bear markets. For the 
other eight sectors, there is a negative stock-bond correlation. 
 
3.3 Impulse Response Functions – transmission of cross-market shocks 
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Thus far, the analysis suggests that bonds have some diversification benefits 
for equity investors but their effectiveness varies across sectors of the equity market. 
We require a more thorough statistical investigation of the stock-bond relationship 
across different market conditions. Regime-dependent IRFs, as proposed by Ehrmann 
et al. (2003), are ideally suited to show the changes (and their statistical significance) 
in the transmission of structural shocks across different market conditions. Therefore, 
we present these here to analyze the transmission of shocks and their cross-market 
effects. Since we are predominantly interested in the ability of bonds to deliver 
diversification benefits to equity investors, we set the VAR up so that the equity shock 
has a contemporaneous effect on the bond market but the reverse is restricted to be 
zero. The IRFs allow us to analyze the sign of the responses in each regime and 
changes in the dynamics of the relationship across regimes. 
 
3.3.1 Market-level analysis 
Firstly, we focus on the relationship between the returns on the total equity 
market and the long-term sovereign bond. Figure 2 presents the IRFs, with 95% 
confidence bands. 
[Insert Figure 2 about here] 
The bond market reacts negatively (opposite in sign) to the equity market shock 
during ‘Bull’ market conditions. This is consistent with investors liquidating bond 
portfolios to increase their exposure to the equity market in pursuit of increased 
returns. While the contemporaneous shock exerts a negative and statistically 
significant effect on the bond market, the shock quickly dies out and the dynamics are 
not statistically different from zero.  
 12
 Bond markets, during the ‘Normal’ regime, respond differently. Now the 
contemporaneous reaction is positive (of the same sign) and stays in the system for 
about one day. During such market conditions, investors don’t seem to alter the 
composition of their portfolios.  
 ‘Bear’ market episodes are still associated with a positive contemporaneous 
shock. This is consistent with the earlier results on the regime-dependent correlations 
and confirms the aforementioned results of Jammazi et al. (2015) and Acosta-
González et al. (2016) for the Spanish market. The reaction to the shock is more 
persistent than in the other regimes and although it turns negative (while remaining 
statistically different from zero) on days 2-4 after the shock, the sum of the reactions 
is positive, suggesting that overall the diversification benefits of sovereign bonds are 
limited following an equity market shock.  
 Across all regimes, a bond market shock elicits little reaction from the stock 
market. In general, the responses are not statistically significant and there is little 
evidence of feedback effects from the sovereign bond to the stock market. Hence, we 
infer that bond market shocks have little impact on equity investors. 
 
3.3.2 Sectoral-level analysis 
 As stated earlier, this result is at odds with much of the extant literature, which 
generally finds that long-term sovereign bonds act as a ‘safe-haven’ asset for equity 
investors during stock market crises. To shed more light on the stock-bond 
relationship for the Spanish financial system, we conduct our analysis at a finer level 
of disaggregation using ten stock market sectoral indices. Figure 3 shows the IRFs. 
[Insert Figure 3 about here] 
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 The sectoral analysis produces a number of noteworthy results. Firstly, there is 
a great deal of uniformity in the bond market response to an equity shock across all 
sectors during both ‘Bull’ and ‘Normal’ regimes. During the low-volatility ‘Bull’ 
state, a shock to any one of nine stock market sectors leads to a negative 
contemporaneous response in the sovereign bond market, consistent with our total 
market response above. The only exception is recorded for an Industrial sector shock 
which elicits a positive, but not statistically distinguishable from zero, response in the 
government debt market. The magnitude of the response is relatively small in this 
regime and shocks die out quickly. In most cases, their influence is limited to the 
initial day. 
 A similarly consistent pattern emerges during the ‘Normal’ regime, even 
though the bond market response is of the opposite sign. A shock to any equity market 
sector generates a positive response in the bond market and its magnitude ranges from 
0.025 to 0.28. Shocks are a little more persistent relative to the ‘Bull’ market but 
generally their influence has dissipated within 3-4 days.  
 Secondly, the high-volatility ‘Bear’ regime is where the sectoral analysis 
provides most insight into the total market behavior. The earlier finding that Spanish 
equity and sovereign bond returns were positively correlated during market downturns 
appears to be driven by just two sectors; namely Financials and Oil & Gas. 
Furthermore, shocks to both of these sectors exhibit more persistence during the 
‘Bear’ market than in other market conditions. Given their relative size5 (see Figure 
4), it seems that Financials are the main cause of this positive comovement during the 
crisis episode. This is consistent with the argument that, generally, financial crashes 
lead to debt crises (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2011) and that, specifically, during the most 
                                                 
5 Over our sample period, Financials dominate the Spanish market. On average, they account for 34% 
of total market capitalization over this period. Oil & Gas accounts for about 6.3% on average. Thus the 
Financial sector is about 5 times larger than the Oil & Gas sector. 
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recent crisis, difficulties in the domestic banking sector caused price declines and 
increased uncertainty for domestic sovereign bonds (see Acharya et al., 2014; and 
Mody and Sandri, 2012). Therefore it can be argued that shocks to the domestic 
financial system also exerted an adverse influence on the market for Spanish 
government debt. The bailout of the Bankia group in December 2010 and its 
subsequent partial nationalization in May 2012 saw a transfer of banking debts and 
risks to the sovereign, thus inextricably linking the banking sector and government 
debt. A shock to the Oil & Gas sector generates a similar response but it is worth 
recalling that the ‘Bear’ regime for this sector has the shortest duration and lowest 
frequency so that coupled with its size suggests that it is a less influential sector than 
Financials on the behavior of the total equity market. The positive comovement 
between the returns to the Oil & Gas sector and bonds may be attributed to the special 
feature of this market whereby income shortfalls for energy providers are covered by 
the state. The so-called ‘déficit de tarifa’ means that adverse shocks for this sector 
also impact on the sovereign who have to meet greater funding requirements. The 
coincidence of this ‘Bear’ regime with an already sensitive period in Eurozone 
sovereign debt markets generates this positive Spanish bond market reaction.  
Shocks to the other eight stock market sectors generate a more homogeneous 
response in the bond market. The contemporaneous reaction is small but negative and 
exhibits little persistence. This response is consistent the empirical evidence from 
non-crisis countries. Thus, sovereign bonds still offer some diversification benefits for 
equity investments in these eight sectors but such benefits are limited for holders of 
stocks in the Financial and Oil & Gas sectors. 
[Insert Figure 4 about here] 
 15
An examination of the feedback effects from a bond market shock to the stock market 
sectors reveals that there are little or no such effects in ‘Bull’ or ‘Normal’ markets. 
There is some limited evidence of statistically significant feedback effects to the 
Financials, Basic Materials, Healthcare, Telecoms and Utilities sectors on the day 
after a bond market shock. These effects are short lived with none persisting for more 
than a single day. 
 In summary, the sectoral analysis shows that the bond market response to an 
equity market shock is homogeneous during more benign market conditions but 
becomes more heterogeneous during stock market downturns. The positive correlation 
between returns on the total stock market and long-term sovereign bonds during 
‘Bear’ markets appears to be mainly driven by the Financial sector and the Oil & Gas 
sector to a lesser extent. It is consistent with the transfer of previously private banking 
debts to the sovereign during the bailout and recapitalization programs extended to 
impaired domestic banks by the government. Sovereign bonds do not provide a good 
hedge for the risks of these sectors as their risks tend to transfer to government during 
crisis periods. 
 
4. Conclusions 
 We examine the stock-bond relationship for Spain and consider the ability of 
long-term government bonds to hedge against equity market risk. The recent literature 
suggests that Spain is different to other big developed financial markets in that returns 
to equity and sovereign bonds are positively correlated during a stock market crisis 
and hence bonds offer limited diversification benefits to equity investors. Employing 
a MS-VAR model, we confirm this result for the total market. However, a sectoral 
analysis sheds greater light on the driving force behind this finding. In fact, just two 
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sectors – Financials and Oil & Gas – appear to generate this positive comovement at 
the market level. Given the relative size of the sectors and the relative frequency and 
duration of their adverse shocks, we posit that the Financial sector is predominantly 
responsible for this positive correlation. The transfer of banking debts and risks to the 
sovereign during the crisis meant that the fortunes of the banking sector and domestic 
government debt instruments became inextricably linked and meant that sovereign 
bonds were no longer suitable ‘safe-haven’ assets for holders of financial stocks. 
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Table 1: Summary Statistics 
 Mean  Volatility Skewness Kurtosis 
Panel A 
Equity Market 0.0255 1.3332 0.0345 5.9083 
10-year Bond 0.0259 0.4833 0.9671 15.3000 
Panel B 
Financials 0.0094 1.7869 0.3592 8.7324 
Basic Materials 0.0193 1.4335 -0.1820 3.4578 
Industrials 0.0315 1.3331 -0.3150 3.6935 
Consumer Goods 0.0404 0.8848 -0.0641 8.5577 
Consumer Services 0.0565 1.4619 0.1580 4.0571 
Telecoms 0.0201 1.4562 -0.0545 5.6547 
Technology -0.0123 1.6872 -1.4511 28.3445 
Utilities 0.0420 1.3401 -0.0761 7.3695 
Healthcare 0.0518 1.3511 -0.6001 7.6829 
Oil & Gas 0.0097 1.5794 -0.3471 6.1392 
Notes: This table presents summary statistics for the daily percentage returns on the total 
stock market index, the 10-year government bond, and the sectoral equity indices used in the 
study.  
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Table 2: Estimates of Expected Returns across Regimes 
 
 
10-year bond with 
Expected Return 
Bull Market Normal Market Bear Market 
µE µB µE µB µE µB 
Total Equity 
Market 
0.161 
(0.026) 
0.016 
(0.009) 
-0.034 
(0.038) 
0.028 
(0.012) 
-0.213 
(0.141) 
0.013 
(0.050) 
Financials 0.126 
(0.025) 
0.014 
(0.008) 
-0.013 
(0.043) 
0.036 
(0.011) 
-0.132 
(0.154) 
0.013 
(0.041) 
Basic Materials 0.153 
(0.032) 
0.023 
(0.008) 
-0.081 
(0.065) 
0.005 
(0.037) 
-0.217 
(0.084) 
0.031 
(0.017) 
Industrials 0.160 
(0.024) 
0.029 
(0.008) 
-0.044 
(0.060) 
0.013 
(0.032) 
-0.236 
(0.090) 
0.031 
(0.017) 
Consumer Goods 0.071 
(0.016) 
0.024 
(0.008) 
-0.019 
(0.036) 
0.007 
(0.031) 
0.021 
(0.078) 
0.043 
(0.023) 
Consumer 
Services 
0.153 
(0.024) 
0.021 
(0.008) 
0.061 
(0.077) 
0.018 
(0.037) 
-0.030 
(0.057) 
0.032 
(0.012) 
Telecoms 0.081 
(0.024) 
0.024 
(0.007) 
-0.128 
(0.093) 
-0.009 
(0.041) 
-0.158 
0.125 
0.042 
(0.029) 
Technology 0.080 
(0.026) 
0.016 
(0.007) 
-0.104 
(0.085) 
0.006 
(0.037) 
-0.195 
(0.114) 
0.064 
(0.021) 
Utilities 0.112 
(0.019) 
0.027 
(0.007) 
-0.013 
(0.070) 
0.011 
(0.034) 
-0.273 
(0.135) 
0.032 
(0.026) 
Healthcare 0.118 
(0.025) 
0.027 
(0.008) 
0.116 
(0.054) 
0.024 
(0.031) 
-0.134 
(0.073) 
0.026 
(0.015) 
Oil & Gas 0.103 
(0.027) 
0.023 
(0.007) 
-0.022 
(0.055) 
0.020 
(0.016) 
-0.355 
(0.245) 
0.019 
(0.077) 
Notes: This Table presents the expected returns, generated by the estimated model, for 
equities (µE) and the 10-year government bond (µB) in each of the regimes. The 
numbers in parentheses are standard errors. 
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Table 3: Estimates of Volatilities across Regimes 
 
 
10-year bond with 
Volatilities 
Bull Market Normal Market Bear Market 
ߪாଶ ߪ஻ଶ ߪாଶ ߪ஻ଶ ߪாଶ ߪ஻ଶ 
Total Equity 
Market 
0.370 
(0.027) 
0.055 
(0.003) 
1.571 
(0.097) 
0.160 
(0.009) 
6.274 
(0.566) 
0.879 
(0.083) 
Financials 0.512 
(0.029) 
0.059 
(0.003) 
2.346 
(0.116) 
0.141 
(0.008) 
10.936 
(0.910) 
0.773 
(0.063) 
Basic Materials 0.771 
(0.046) 
0.069 
(0.003) 
1.861 
(0.143) 
0.694 
(0.054) 
4.717 
(0.323) 
0.184 
(0.012) 
Industrials 0.642 
(0.033) 
0.072 
(0.004) 
1.982 
(0.133) 
0.654 
(0.046) 
4.284 
(0.299) 
0.143 
(0.009) 
Consumer Goods 0.336 
(0.021) 
0.076 
(0.004) 
0.711 
(0.050) 
0.644 
(0.051) 
2.508 
(0.279) 
0.156 
(0.019) 
Consumer 
Services 
0.464 
(0.032) 
0.060 
(0.003) 
2.714 
(0.201) 
0.708 
(0.066) 
3.537 
(0.199) 
0.145 
(0.036) 
Telecoms 0.908 
(0.049) 
0.077 
(0.004) 
3.492 
(0.285) 
0.737 
(0.073) 
5.155 
(0.619) 
0.238 
(0.056) 
Technology 0.901 
(0.052) 
0.072 
(0.004) 
3.692 
(0.264) 
0.732 
(0.067) 
7.284 
(0.746) 
0.185 
(0.016) 
Utilities 0.627 
(0.027) 
0.078 
(0.003) 
2.648 
(0.191) 
0.698 
(0.054) 
6.079 
(0.653) 
0.195 
(0.017) 
Healthcare 0.600 
(0.040) 
0.067 
(0.004) 
1.683 
(0.116) 
0.646 
(0.046) 
3.875 
(0.260) 
0.141 
(0.009) 
Oil & Gas 0.825 
(0.059) 
0.067 
(0.003) 
2.793 
(0.255) 
0.209 
(0.023) 
10.388 
(1.627) 
1.095 
(0.170) 
Notes: This Table presents the regime-specific variances, generated by the estimated 
model, for equities (σ2E) and the 10-year government bond (σ2B). The numbers in 
parentheses are standard errors. 
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Table 4. Characteristics of regimes   
 
 Duration  Frequency  
Bull Normal Bear Bull Normal Bear  
Equity Market 18.6 13.7 7.3 36.9 49.7 13.4 
Financials 37.5 18.9 8.7 32.7 50.6 16.7 
Basic Materials 23.3 15.6 13.5 54.8 18.5 26.7 
Industrials 20.7 13.6 15.0 55.4 22.3 22.3 
Consumer Goods 13.5 15.5 4.2 60.3 22.6 17.1 
Consumer Services 18.3 15.7 17.6 40.3 18.6 41.1 
Telecoms 18.9 18.2 5.6 65.6 17.2 17.2 
Technology 13.6 16.9 5.6 58.5 19.3      22.2 
Utilities 29.5 11.5 12.0 65.9 20.5 13.6 
Healthcare 16.0 16.8 11.0 48.2 22.6 29.2 
Oil & Gas 31.2 11.9 4.7 51.2 39.8 9.0 
Notes: This Table presents ‘Duration’ and ‘Frequency’ statistics for each of the 
regimes in each of the estimated models. Each model is estimated with the returns on 
the 10-year government bond and an equity market index. Duration is the average 
length of time (measured in days) for which a given regime persists, while 
‘Frequency' is the proportion of time that the returns spend in each regime in the 
‘steady state’. 
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Table 5. Transition Probabilities 
 
 p11 p21 p31 p12 p22 p32 p13 p23 p33 
Total Market 0.946 0.051 0.003 0.038 0.927 0.035 0.006 0.133 0.861
Financials 0.973 0.025 0.002 0.016 0.974 0.036 0.003 0.111 0.886
Basic Mats. 0.958 0.016 0.026 0.035 0.936 0.029 0.063 0.011 0.927
Industrials 0.952 0.026 0.022 0.062 0.927 0.011 0.058 0.009 0.934
Cons. Goods 0.927 0.017 0.056 0.037 0.935 0.028 0.210 0.025 0.765
Cons. Services 0.946 0.014 0.040 0.025 0.936 0.039 0.042 0.015 0.943
Telecoms 0.948 0.012 0.040 0.036 0.945 0.019 0.168 0.011 0.820
Technology 0.927 0.016 0.057 0.027 0.941 0.032 0.169 0.009 0.822
Utilities 0.966 0.023 0.011 0.067 0.913 0.020 0.063 0.021 0.916
Healthcare 0.937 0.020 0.043 0.035 0.940 0.025 0.076 0.014 0.910
Oil & Gas 0.968 0.030 0.002 0.039 0.916 0.045 0.009 0.205 0.786
Notes: This Table presents the transition probabilities for moving between the regimes 
in each application. Each row represents the 3x3 matrix of transition probabilities 
from the model of the 10-year government bond and the stated equity index. 
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Table 6. Regime-Specific Correlations 
 
 Bull Normal Bear 
Total Market -0.0964 0.0907 0.2336 
Financials -0.1018 0.1302 0.2388 
Basic Materials -0.0902 0.4186 -0.1295 
Industrials -0.0156 0.4195 -0.2548 
Cons. Goods -0.0516 0.2695 -0.0790 
Cons. Services -0.0444 0.3294 -0.0903 
Telecoms 0.0136 0.4706 -0.2031 
Technology -0.1376 0.3640 -0.0578 
Utilities -0.0396 0.4773 -0.2117 
Healthcare -0.0508 0.2776 -0.1800 
Oil & Gas -0.1583 0.0622 0.2983 
Notes: This presents the regime-dependent pairwise correlations between long-term bonds 
and equities market generated by our MS-VAR model.  
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Figure 1. Regime Probabilities 
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Figure 2. Cross-Market Response to a Shock – Total Market Analysis 
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Figure 3. Cross-Market Response to a Shock – Sectoral Analysis 
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Figure 3. continued 
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Figure 3. continued 
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Figure 3. continued 
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Figure 4. Relative Size of Spanish Stock Market Sectors 
 
 
 
Notes: This Figure shows the proportion of the total stock market value that was attributed to 
each of the indicated sectors at the end of each year of our sample. Financials dominate the 
market, accounting for 34% of total market capitalization on average and ranging from 31% 
to 38% over our sample. Others include Basic Materials, Consumer Goods, Healthcare, and 
Technology. 
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